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I would like to talk today about the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) that EPA has set for ozone. I
prepared comments on EPA's November 1996 proposed ozone
standard for the Regulatory Analysis Program at George Ma-
son University.' The program is dedicated to the advance-
ment of knowledge of regulations and their impacts on
society. As part of its mission, it produces careful and in-
dependent analyses of agency rulemaking proposals from the
perspective of public interest. Our objective is to provide
analyses that reflect the concerns of the average citizen.
Before I discuss the ozone standard itself, I would like to
add to what the others have said today about the role of eco-
nomic analysis in setting NAAQS under the Clean Air Act
(CAA). EPA's mandate, as you have heard, is to protect public
health and welfare with an adequate margin of safety.2
Many people would argue that this means that one may not
consider costs or other economic factors in setting NAAQS.
* Ms. Dudley is a Senior Research Fellow at the Regulatory Studies Pro-
gram, Mercatus Center, George Mason University. At the time of this presen-
tation she was Vice President and Director of Environmental Analysis at
Economics Incorporated. She is also a member of the Virginia Waste Manage-
ment Board, which is responsible for promulgating and enforcing waste man-
agement regulations.
Ms. Dudley has worked on environmental and regulatory matters at the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB).
Ms. Dudley graduated from the Sloan School of Management at M.I.T. She
has written extensively on regulatory costs and benefits especially relating to
environmental issues.
1. See generally Dudley and Gramm, Risk Analysis, Vol. 17, No 4, 1997.
The program is now called the Regulatory Studies Program of the Mercatus
Center at George Mason University. See also Comments on the proposed ozone
NAAQS of the Regulatory Analysis Program, Center for the Study of Public
Choice, George Mason University, March 12, 1997.
2. See CAA § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1) (1994).
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Yet, EPA's science advisors concluded that there is no basis
for determining a threshold level of ozone that is protective of
public health and welfare. The Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee (CASAC) emphasized the uncertainties in the
risk and exposure information on which the proposal is based
and highlighted the small differences in health protection be-
tween the current standard and the proposed alternatives.
CASAC also noted that the ranges in health effects for the
different proposals overlap.3 While EPA argues that its deci-
sion is purely a public health decision, its scientific experts
did not find the proposed standard to be significantly more
protective of public health than the existing standard.
Once you recognize that science alone cannot determine
definitively what the standard should be, then you are faced
with policy decisions, and policy decisions involve tradeoffs.
We do not have to call those tradeoffs "economics" in order to
recognize that a standard that makes public health or welfare
worse off is not protective of public health and welfare. That
is really what we try to do with cost/benefit analysis. The
cost/benefit analysis tries to look at the good and bad effects
of rules to ensure that policy decisions make people better off,
not worse off. The "costs" do not have to be in dollars. It is
convenient to put costs and benefits in dollar terms to facili-
tate comparisons but, costs can take many forms, including
health effects.
I Nyant to talk briefly about the cost of the ozone stan-
dard.4 As you can see from the table below, EPA estimates
that the cost for only parts of the nation to meet the standard
will be over $1 billion per year. If the whole nation were to
comply, EPA estimates costs exceeding $9 billion per year.
r 3. Letter f4om CASAC to Carol Browner, EPA Administrator, re closure on
the Primary Standard Position of the Staff Paper for Ozone (on file with
speaker). CASAC is a standing committee of EPA's Science Advisory Board.
4. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,856 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 50); Revised Requirements for Designation of Reference and
Equivalent Methods for PM 25 and Ambient Air Quality Surveillance for Partic-





(Billions of 1990 $)
NET
ANNUAL ANNUAL BENEFITS
COMPLIANCE SCENARIO BENEFITS COSTS (COSTS)
Partial Compliance $0.1 - $0.8 $1.2 - $2.3 $(0.4) - $(1.5)
Previous Standard
Partial Attainment $0.4 - $2.1 $1.1 $1.0 - $(0.7)
Full Attainment $1.5 - $1.8 $9.6 $(1.1) - $(8.1)
Now, the expected cost is large, but cost alone does not
tell the whole story. You can see from the table that costs are
expected to exceed the benefits under most of the scenarios
EPA considered. Also note that EPA believes that by the
year 2010, more than ten years in the future, a large part of
the country will still not be able to meet the new standard.5
EPA estimates that between thirty-nine and fifty-seven
million people will live in areas that cannot attain the old
standard,6 and an additional fourteen to thirty-two million
people will be in non-attainment with the new standard.
According to Ron Evans, EPA used a cost often thousand per
ton to estimate full attainment costs. President Clinton
agreed that this is the maximum we should be spending on
these standards, but that kind of limit on control costs begs
the question of what it means to be non-attainment. There is
still going to be a huge population in non-attainment areas,
and that in itself imposes costs because non-attainment areas
face restrictions on economic growth.
It is difficult to get a good estimate of what the true social
costs of nonattainment are, but I did a very rough estimate
based on manufacturing establishments moving overseas.
My analysis suggests that the decline in Gross Domestic
Product for achieving even partial compliance is above eighty
billion dollars each year. So, even for the partial compliance
scenario, there is a hidden cost associated with being out of
5. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at
38,856.
6. In 1979, EPA relaxed the standard from 0.08 parts per million (ppm) to
0.12 ppm. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1984).
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compliance. Finally, my evaluation concluded that because
EPA (1) buried some costs in its "baseline"; (2) used
artificially low estimates for incremental compliance; and (3)
assigned no costs for areas that could get within sixty-four
percent of the standard, its cost estimates are severely
understated. My calculations suggest that the costs of full
compliance will be closer to eighty billion dollars each year
(almost ten times greater than EPA's estimate).
What are we buying for eighty billion dollars per year? I
think it is safe to say that what we are buying is small
changes in health for a small population of sensitive
individuals. Even scientists who are strong proponents of the
rule agree that the vast majority of the population "will
observe no effect on their health or well-being as a result of
this rule."7 It may sound callous to say, "What? Eighty billion
dollars for a few cases of asthma?" Well, let us look a little
further at specifically what those health effects are. EPA
focused and defended its rule based largely on the benefit it
provides to children and other individuals with asthma and
respiratory problems." I agree that asthma is a distressing
health problem. It is most prevalent among urban poor, one
third of its victims are children, and it has been increasing
dramatically over the last decade.
Yet, air quality has been improving over the last decade;
ozone levels in particular declined six percent between 1986
and 1995. 9 Recently, scientists at the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases funded a study to solve the
paradox of why reported cases of asthma are growing when
the factors believed to be causing it, such as air pollution, are
declining. The study revealed that, "the leading cause of
asthma by far was . . . . proteins in the droppings and
carcasses of the German cockroach." The American Thoracic
7. See Dr. Lippman's response to questions by Senator Allard on February
5, 1997. In its comments on Dec. 13, 1996, the President's Council of Economic
Advisors concluded: "reductions in adverse health effects, even for 'sensitive'
populations, are small."
8. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at
38,856.





Society concluded "poverty may be the number one risk
factor for asthma."
Thus, even focusing narrowly on asthma, the rule is not
likely to produce significant health benefits. If we step back
from asthma, and evaluate public health more broadly, the
proposal is not an effective policy. Due to ozone's screening
effect on harmful ultraviolet-B (UV-B) radiation, the revised
ozone standard will increase malignant and non-melanoma
skin cancers and cataracts, as well as other UV-B related
health risks. However, rather than presenting these
important tradeoffs, EPA explicitly ignored information on
the offsetting health effects caused by the effect of ozone on
ultraviolet radiation.
Ron Evans discussed these UV-B effects and said that
EPA recognized this "dis-benefit" but found the effect too
difficult to quantify. But, in fact, quantification of these
effects is well documented and well established. It is the
basis for the stratospheric ozone rules.10 Many have argued
that these health effects are a lot more certain than the
health benefits that EPA predicted.
Based on studies EPA conducted to support its
stratospheric ozone rules, it appears that these UV-B effects
could dwarf the positive benefits EPA attributes to the ozone
NAAQS standard. A Department of Energy analysis
indicates that the ten parts per billion (ppb) change in the
ozone standard could result in 25-50 new melanoma-caused
fatalities, 130 to 260 incidences of cutaneous melanoma,
2,000 to 11,000 new cases of non-melanoma skin cancer, and
13,000 to 28,000 new incidences of cataracts each year.1 That
suggests the rule will induce 25 to 50 more fatalities each
year (since EPA's best estimate of the health benefits of the
proposal do not include any reduced fatalities). To compare
the mortality effects, we used EPA's approach to convert
health effects to dollars. We estimate that the negative
health impacts from this proposal will exceed EPA's best
10. See CAA § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 7671.
11. Presented at a March 21, 1995 meeting of CASAC.
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estimate of the positive health effects by over $300 million
per year.
In conclusion, EPA has a responsibility for setting ozone
NAAQS that protect public health and welfare, yet it has
interpreted its charge so narrowly that it has ignored
important effects of its standard. There are far more effective
ways to achieve the goal of protecting public health and
welfare. First, EPA's CASAC recommended that targeted
approaches are better and more effective ways of reducing
people's exposure. Second, if our concern is asthma, there are
much more effective ways to spend money to reduce childhood
asthma and other respiratory problems.
The current ozone standard will not improve public
health. At best, the benefits will be small; the offsetting
health dis-benefits will be much greater and will result in net
harm to the public health. Finally, this rule will impose costs
on every aspect of our lives. Considering that poverty may be
a more significant factor for asthma than air quality, the rule
may be harming the very diseases that it is purportedly
designed to help.
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